Prompt injection, leaked data and agents with too much access are how companies get hurt by AI now. We threat model, build and run AI agents and apps that contain those risks by design, and we run our own company on the same practices.
Last reviewed ·Reviewed every week against official sources
An attempt to steer the agentStopped at a layer
What changed
The attack now arrives as words.
An AI agent reads email, web pages, files and chat, and it can act on what it reads. Anyone who can put text in front of it can try to steer it. Here is where the risks sit, numbered the way the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications numbers them.
How we defend. Text from email, web pages and files is fenced and handled as data, never as instructions, and the agent cannot act on it without a check in code.
Closed in the build
LLM02
Sensitive information disclosure
How we defend. Agents see only the records their job needs, and answers are screened for secrets and personal data before anyone sees them.
Closed in the build
LLM03
Supply chain
How we defend. Models, libraries and plugins come from known sources, pinned to versions we tested, and reviewed before each upgrade.
Shared with the model provider
LLM04
Data and model poisoning
How we defend. Knowledge an agent learns from is curated and recorded with where it came from, so a planted document can be found and pulled.
Shared with the model provider
LLM05
Improper output handling
How we defend. Whatever a model writes is checked like any untrusted input before it reaches a database, a browser or another system.
Closed in the build
LLM06
Excessive agency
How we defend. Each agent gets the fewest tools it needs. Anything that sends, pays, signs or deletes waits for a person or a written rule.
Closed in the build
LLM07
System prompt leakage
How we defend. No secret or access rule lives in a prompt. Keys stay in a vault, and permissions are enforced by code.
Closed in the build
LLM08
Vector and embedding weaknesses
How we defend. Search over your documents respects who may read them, so one customer's files never answer another customer's question.
Closed in the build
LLM09
Misinformation
How we defend. Facts an agent states are checked against your records and sources, and it says so when it does not know.
Shared with the model provider
LLM10
Unbounded consumption
How we defend. Spend limits, rate limits and loop guards on every agent, so a bad prompt cannot run up a bill or drain a service.
Closed in the build
Risk names from the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, 2025 edition; the 2026 edition reranks them, and the threat watch below follows it. No defense makes an AI system unbreakable: these contain the damage when one layer is fooled. The defenses are ours.
What we do
Six ways we keep AI in line.
Start with a review of what you already run, or have us build the agent with the defenses in from day one.
A review of the AI tools and agents you already run: what they can read, what they can do, where your data goes and who can change them. You get a ranked list of fixes.
Threat modeling for AI systems
Every input an attacker can touch, every action the system can take and every record it can read, mapped and ranked before a line of code is written.
Secure agent and app builds
Agents and apps built with the defenses designed in: the fewest tools, a person's approval on anything that cannot be undone, and guardrails tested before launch.
Prompt injection and data leak defenses
Untrusted text fenced, tool calls checked by code instead of the model's good intentions, and answers screened for secrets and personal data.
Access and secrets
Secrets in a vault, never in code or a prompt. A separate, scoped key for every agent. Two-step sign-in for admins. Access you can take back in one step.
Monitoring and incident response
Every agent action logged with what and why, alerts on anything unusual, one switch that stops every agent, and a written plan for the day something goes wrong.
How we build
Security in the blueprint, not bolted on.
Six steps on every AI build, each tied to a function of the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Govern, the fourth function, is the policy that sits over all of them.
01
Map
Every input, action and record the system touches, and who could reach each one.
NIST: Map
02
Limit
The fewest tools and the narrowest access each agent's job allows.
NIST: Manage
03
Fence
Outside text marked untrusted, and approvals on anything that cannot be undone.
NIST: Manage
04
Test
Injection, leak and misuse attempts run against it before launch, and again after every change.
NIST: Measure
05
Watch
Logs, alerts, spend limits and a drill that proves the alarms still ring.
NIST: Measure
06
Respond
A stop switch, a lockdown, a written runbook and a review after every incident.
NIST: Manage
NIST: GovernOur AI policy: who is accountable, how data is handled, and how we prove the system works.
What ships with every build
A threat model you can readEvery input, action and record, ranked, in plain words.
A map of what each agent can reachIts models, keys, tools and data, so nothing is a surprise later.
Attack tests that stayInjection, leak and misuse attempts, rerun on every change.
An action log and alertsWhat each agent did, when and on whose word.
A runbook and a stop switchWho does what when something goes wrong, and one way to stop it all.
A retest after changesNew model, new tool, new data: the tests run again before it ships.
Our own house
The practices we run on our own systems.
We run HQ Labz on AI agents of our own, so every practice on this page is one we live with every day. It is written as practice, not as a badge.
Where a client needs an outside audit, we prepare the evidence and work alongside their auditor.
Every AI agent has its own scoped access and only the tools its job needs.
Client messages and anything in a client's name wait for that person's yes, or follow written rules they set.
Text from email, web pages and documents is marked untrusted and never followed as an instruction.
Secrets live in a keychain or a vault, never in code or a prompt, and automated checks stop private details from reaching a public page.
A security check runs every 15 minutes, and a weekly drill plants harmless test intrusions that must each be caught.
One command stops every agent at once, and a lockdown cuts off every connected app.
Two-step sign-in protects our admin and our command center.
Every agent action is recorded: what it did, when, and on whose word.
Found a security issue in something we built? Tell us.
Frameworks
We work to the public playbooks.
These are the checklists behind our reviews and builds. We name what we follow, never a seal we have not earned.
New attacks, guidance and research that change how AI should be built, each with its source and the day we checked it.
Last reviewed ·Reviewed every week against official sources
ThreatWatching
LiteLLM package compromised
Reported by Wiz Research · Worldwide
A malicious version, 1.107.0, uploaded to PyPI and Docker, then quarantined the same day
A widely used open source gateway for AI models shipped a version that stole browser, cloud and AI keys, downloaded about 49,000 times before it was pulled. Pin every AI library to a version you tested, and keep keys out of reach of your build tools.
Two open source plugins for checking an agent's patches
When an AI agent fixes a bug, it can change more than the bug. Review an agent's code changes like a new hire's, with tests that look for what else broke.
Wiz traces a campaign from one search ad click to a hijacked billing account
Attackers stole cloud logins through a search ad and ran AI models on the victim's bill, into hundreds of thousands of dollars. Spend limits, billing alerts and two-step sign-in on every cloud and AI account cut it off.
Federal civilian agencies must remove DeepSeek products and leave them out of purchases. Vendors to those agencies should know which AI models sit inside their products.
The catalog of real attacks on AI systems now covers more ways to attack AI agents, such as discovering what an agent can do at runtime. Useful for threat models and tests.
2026 edition announced, ranked against thousands of real incidents
The risk list security reviewers use for AI apps, reranked with real incident data. Excessive agency, an agent with more tools and permissions than its job needs, is now number three.
A virtual machine will not contain a capable agent
Trail of Bits · Worldwide
Research published
A sandbox alone is no longer a safe box for a capable AI agent. Limit what the agent can reach in the first place: its keys, its network and its tools.
Federal prosecutors must prioritize cases against anyone who uses AI, AI agents included, to break into computers or data. Keep records of what your agents accessed and on whose authority.
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Work with us
Bring us your AI, built or planned.
Start with an AI security review or a threat model, or have us build the agent with the defenses designed in. Billed at $100 an hour, with a written quote after a free discovery call.